The Constitution Society: Working to promote informed debate about constitutional reform

THE WEST LOTHIAN QUESTION: what representation should a devolved region have in Westminster?

In 1977 Tam Dayell, MP for West Lothian, asked whether it was acceptable for members from Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales to vote on legislation which only affects England. Since the devolution of powers created legislative bodies to enact laws in these three regions, the question has become all the more pertinent.

The Coalition Government announced the intention to establish a commission of independent experts to consider how best to resolve the West Lothian Question in 2011.

There are a number of options for the representation of devolved regions in Parliament, all of which are problematic:

1. NO REPRESENTATION AT ALL

This is arguably unfair, because the people of all three regions continue to pay taxes to the central government and therefore should have representation there.

2. THE ‘IN AND OUT’ SOLUTION: representation, but exclusion on particular subjects

One solution is to allow MPs from devolved regions to remain at Westminster, but be excluded from matters exclusively concerned with matters from the other regions. Thus, a Scottish MP would not be allowed to speak or vote on matters exclusively concerned with England, Wales, or Northern Ireland. However, there may be problems defining what is a matter ‘exclusive’ to one particular region.

The Legislation (Territorial Extent) Bill 2010-11, a Private Member’s Bill introduced by Harriet Baldwin MP proposed a variation of this solution. The Bill reached a Third Reading in the House of Commons (a considerable feat for a Private Member’s Bill).

Ms Baldwin speaks about the provisions of her Bill:

Both the ‘no representation’ and the ‘in and out solution’ options raise significant political concerns. The Labour Party has always needed the MPs returned from Scotland and Wales to maintain a majority in Government.

The ‘in and out’ solution could create disruption in cases where the ruling party holds a slim majority in Westminster, and the composition of the government might change depending on the matter being debated. For instance, on a matter affecting only the English, it might be that a Labour government could not muster a majority, and so ‘the government’ might shift to the opposition. This might force a Labour administration to introduce all of its legislative proposals across the entire nation in order to take advantage of their full base of MPs.

3. REDUCED REPRESENTATION

This is the solution which has been used historically. For instance, after the establishment of a Parliament in Northern Ireland, Northern Irish MPs in Westminster continued to have full voting rights. However, their number was reduced to 13, or about two-thirds of what Northern Ireland should have had in Westminster on the basis of population.

One answer, then, might be to allow MPs from devolved areas to retain full voting rights, but reduce their number by some specified proportion. Doubtless the extent of this reduction would be difficult to decide.

4. LEAVE THINGS AS THEY ARE

This approach would recognise that asymmetry between regions in the UK has long been present, and need not be answered.

THE ENGLISH QUESTION – Two key aspects:

1. DOES ENGLAND’S PLACE WITHIN THE UNION NEED STRENGTHENING?

Two common suggestions on how to achieve this are the creation of an English Parliament and the introduction of English votes on English laws:

a) An English Parliament

There are a number of practical problems associated with the establishment of an English Parliament;

• Given that English MPs make up 80% of all Westminster MPs, and make law for 85% of the UK, an English Parliament would seem an unnecessary replication of the UK Parliament. What would be the role of the English Parliament, and what impact would it have on the role of the UK Parliament? Similarly, where would the English Parliament be located?
• An English Parliament would also create, in effect, a federal system; but it would be a federal system which was highly asymmetrical, with one constituent unit—England—being dominant. It would, in effect, be more important than Westminster.

b) English votes on English laws

Concerns raised about this proposal are largely political. Given the reliance of some governments on their MPs in Scotland and Wales to provide them with a majority in the House of Commons, preventing those MPs from voting on certain policies could make it difficult for elected governments to implement their legislative programmes.

2. DOES ENGLAND’S GOVERNMENT NEED DECENTRALISATION?

If the concern raised by the English question is that power is too distant from the English people, then one potential solution is regionalism. However the Blair government’s attempt to create a regional assembly in the Northeast (an intended precursor to a wider program of regionalism) failed, raising doubts as to the public’s willingness to see this solution introduced.

Does the funding of the devolved regions need to be reviewed?

There is widespread criticism of the Barnett formula and the way in which funding is set for the devolved regions:

• In terms of public expenditure, the per capita spend is lowest in England. Many English people raise the concern that they subsidise the devolved regions at their own expense.
• Many in the devolved regions argue that the Barnett formula takes no account of the real needs of each region and its people.
• The white paper issued by the Scottish government on 30 November 2009 – “Your Scotland, Your Voice, A National Conversation” notes ‘the Scottish budget depends on unilateral decisions by the United Kingdom Government on spending in England. For example, the implementation of efficiency savings across the United Kingdom Government, and reductions in Department of Health baselines in England in the 2009 Budget, resulted in the Scottish budget being cut by £500 million in 2010/11.”

The Liberal Democrat and Conservative manifestos in 2010 both contained proposals for changing the formula. In the 2011 Coalition Agreement, however, the parties indicated that any change would have to wait for ‘stabilisation of public finances’ (with a theoretical date set of 2015, at the very end of the current Parliament).